Return of the Poor Man’s Napoleon
After Napoleon Bonaparte returned from his exile on the island of Elba in 1815, he undertook what is historically known as the "Hundred Days" campaign, an attempt to regain power in France. During his campaign, Napoleon led a small army of his most loyal followers and crossed France, garnering significant popular support along the way, especially among former soldiers. He arrived in Paris on March 20, 1815, where he was welcomed with great enthusiasm.
Napoleon quickly regained power in France, once again becoming the ruler after Louis XVIII abdicated the throne. Napoleon did not engage in direct acts of revenge; instead, his priority was to consolidate his power and stabilize France after a period of turmoil. He implemented several measures to improve the economy, rebuild the army, and strengthen internal authority.
However, the other European powers were concerned about the recovery of France and the resurgence of their old adversary, Napoleon Bonaparte. They formed an alliance against him, which ultimately led to his decisive and final defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in June 1815, after which he was exiled to the island of Saint Helena in the South Atlantic, where he spent the remainder of his life until his death on May 5, 1821.
The return of a defeated leader and his triumph over his opponents is usually characterized by a desire for revenge and retribution, often opening the door to a bloody era no less severe than all that preceded it. Although Napoleon's return did not have this character, it failed to endure because the opponents of the victorious loser would not forget their history with him, even if he pretended to forget.
A few days ago, armed groups affiliated with the city of Zintan issued a statement announcing their support for Saif al-Islam Gaddafi's candidacy for the presidential elections, asserting that they would not allow what they described as "dubious attempts by some local and international parties to prevent him from exercising his right as a Libyan citizen to run for elections and lead the ranks to serve his country." Given that the statement followed a grand military parade by these armed groups, it did not lack an implicit threat to resort to force and hinted at the possibility of using weapons and assumed support from tribes (which, if their support had any real impact, we wouldn’t be discussing this matter today). As expected, statements of welcome and support from the so-called social councils (formerly popular leaderships) of the tribes supporting the previous regime have followed and continue to be issued to this day.
In this article, we will not delve into the efficacy or significance of these statements, nor will we discuss whether they are mere meaningless papers representing only those who issued them from behind their screens, or that they will fall like autumn leaves with the first retaliatory military campaign from the man with the Crossing Star, who sees Saif al-Gaddafi as the biggest threat to his project of ruling Libya and establishing a new ruling dynasty on the ruins of the Gaddafi dynasty.
However, we will discuss the potential return of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to reclaim his father's throne, and the tools and outcomes of this return.
Libya has witnessed many phases of turmoil since the overthrow of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, with political, tribal, and military forces varying in the country. Alliances were formed and then dissolved, opposites gathered and then separated, figures emerged and then faded, yet Saif al-Islam Gaddafi remains one of the most controversial figures. The man was a flag-bearer for political and social reform during his father’s rule, suffering several setbacks at the hands of those previously known as the old guard (the notorious criminals from security leaderships and revolutionary committees). When the revolution against his father’s regime began, demanding the reforms he appeared to advocate, he quickly reverted to his old ways, donning the cloak of a radical leader defending the regime and was accused of committing crimes against humanity, for which he was tried in Libya and is still wanted by the International Criminal Court.
Considering the support some tribes gave his father, Muammar Gaddafi, based on familial, utilitarian, and authoritarian grounds, these tribes that supported him in the past may remain loyal to the Gaddafi family, making the idea of Saif al-Islam’s return welcomed by these tribes. However, this support may face significant challenges, especially with the current fragmentation of forces and alliances in Libya, and the radical shift of former fighters from these tribes to join Khalifa Haftar’s camp, who was brought by the February revolution they fought so hard against. Some of them may find themselves facing Saif al-Gaddafi, who might lead – paradoxically – former revolution fighters who fought in 2011 against Saif al-Gaddafi and against those loyal to Haftar today who were under Gaddafi’s banner in 2011.
With the near impossibility of Saif al-Gaddafi leading a Napoleonic military campaign ending at Bab al-Azizia due to the lack of the means for such a campaign, another aspect casts its shadow over this return, making its possibility akin to mixing water and fire. Saif al-Gaddafi is not Napoleon Bonaparte, and his campaign on Tripoli, if it happens, will be bloody and vengeful, following in the footsteps of his father, who ruled the country with iron and fire, under whose regime many Libyans faced persecution, torture, forced disappearance, and public execution. The tribes supporting him will carry out acts of revenge, and this is not speculation or analysis, but what supporters of the previous regime have declared since its fall, making those dissatisfied with the current conditions and hesitant to support any military faction over another think a thousand times before supporting a campaign that could end with them hanging on gallows.
Moreover, the recurring appearance of Saif al-Gaddafi and his supporters may alarm the ruler of Rajma, prompting a potential preemptive military campaign to eliminate the threat Saif poses to Haftar’s project. Haftar has the military and human capabilities to do so, although he has not acted yet out of consideration for his major supporters – the Russians – who have invested heavily in Haftar’s project. However, their political experience will not lead them to put all their eggs in one basket – Haftar’s basket – but they will seek to diversify their investments in Libya with more than one partner, and they are interested in keeping Saif al-Gaddafi in the picture as an alternative plan if their main partner fails.
Therefore, Saif al-Gaddafi has no option but to go through elections, as demanded by his military supporters in their parade! To put this possibility in its correct context, it is important to understand the international dynamics surrounding the Libyan reality, where Libya’s relations with other countries could influence Saif al-Islam’s ability to return to power and his stability in it. Regional and international powers form alliances or support certain parties in Libya based on their strategic interests, and none of these parties have any strategic interest in Saif al-Gaddafi’s return except for Russia. Even Russia has a significant strategic ally, and Saif al-Islam is only an alternative plan for them. Additionally, the decision to allow or prevent Saif al-Islam Gaddafi from running in the upcoming presidential elections depends on several factors, including political, security, legal, and international conditions that may strongly obstruct his attempt to reclaim his father’s throne.
Overall, the return of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi to power in Libya is almost impossible, and even if it happens, it will not succeed in achieving stability and development. Achieving these requires broad consensus and inclusive governance that respects human rights and guarantees fundamental freedoms, values absent during his father’s rule, and not present in the dictionary of the tribes supporting him .