The Libyan Crisis: Suspended Agreements and Patchwork Solutions

Since the onset of the Libyan crisis, there has been a long series of attempts to find peaceful solutions, whether through local negotiations or international interventions. Despite the numerous agreements reached between the various parties, most of them have failed to succeed or be translated into tangible outcomes on the ground. These agreements remain suspended and unenforceable, resulting in the ongoing state of chaos and instability.

What further complicates the crisis is that the solutions ultimately adopted are often patchwork in nature designed to achieve temporary de-escalation without addressing the root causes of the conflict. These solutions rely primarily on brokering compromises between warring parties to find common ground, enabling them to reposition themselves and recycle their roles, effectively remaining entrenched in power under new terms.

There has long been cautious optimism after each new agreement signed between Libyan factions from the Skhirat Agreement in 2015 to the more recent meetings held under the auspices of the United Nations or regional powers. Countless attempts have been made to bring about peace, but what these agreements all have in common is their tendency to collide with obstacles that leave them suspended and unimplemented. These obstacles range from the intransigence of those benefitting from the status quo, to the outright impracticality of implementation such as the infamous election law issued by the House of Representatives.

Faced with persistent divisions and implementation failures, the involved parties often resort to makeshift, short-term solutions that act more like painkillers than cures. These measures aim to secure temporary truces or settlements without addressing the structural drivers of the crisis. Notable examples include:

Temporary Power-Sharing: Frequently relies on the distribution of government positions among rival factions as a compromise. However, these arrangements are inherently fragile and prone to collapse, as they are not based on constitutional legitimacy—or even mutual trust but rather on what could be described as honor among thieves.

Appeasing Foreign Stakeholders: Solutions are often imposed by external actors serving regional or international interests, rather than emerging from a genuine national vision. Yet each Libyan faction dons the cloak of patriotic virtue while accusing opponents of treason, all the while engaging in the very same practices like the mutual accusations of bringing in foreign mercenaries. Each side conveniently forgets the mercenaries within its own ranks while denouncing the other for the same crime.

One of the most pressing and complex issues that has recently resurfaced is the crisis surrounding the Central Bank of Libya—the country’s most critical financial institution, responsible for managing state finances. It has been a battleground for political factions for over a decade. Recently, this crisis has once again surged to the forefront, taking center stage in Libya’s endless list of national dilemmas.

To fast-forward past widely known events: the Presidential Council’s dismissal of Central Bank Governor Sadiq Al-Kabir, the opposition from the House of Representatives, Khalifa Haftar’s camp, and Khalid Al-Mishri’s wing of the High Council of State; the support for the dismissal by Abdulhamid Dbeibah’s government and Mohamed Tekala’s wing of the High Council; the oil blockade by Haftar’s forces; the spike and subsequent drop in the parallel market exchange rate for the dollar; Kabir’s threats of catastrophic consequences if not reinstated; and international calls for a comprehensive resolution and an end to unilateral actions.

All of this culminated on Tuesday, September 25, 2024, when the United Nations Support Mission in Libya sponsored a meeting between representatives of the House of Representatives and the High Council of State to discuss appointing a new Central Bank Governor. The two sides agreed to appoint Naji Issa to the position but this step is unlikely to proceed smoothly.

Each party involved will likely claim victory before their respective constituencies. Haftar’s supporters will praise his leadership in the oil blockade, crediting it for forcing a compromise. Menfi’s backers will celebrate his boldness in pushing for Kabir’s removal and withstanding intense pressure. Aguila Saleh’s supporters will loudly applaud the “grand strategist of Libya,” who rejected both Mohamed Al-Shukri and Abdul Fattah Ghafar and got what he wanted. Meanwhile, Dbeibah’s base will hail their prime minister’s tactical genius for eliminating his most formidable rival, Sadiq Al-Kabir.

Yet all of this hinges on follow-up steps that may never come. Even if Aguila Saleh, Haftar, Menfi, and Dbeibah implicitly approve the appointment since it allows each to save face and leaves Kabir as the sole loser the decision still requires ratification by the High Council of State. However, the council is deeply fractured, struggling even to convene, let alone make binding decisions.

In fact, the High Council of State has effectively split into two rival bodies. Neither has convened in recent memory, yet both continue issuing statements and claiming sole legitimacy while accusing the other of impersonating authority. This division makes it nearly impossible for the council to make decisive rulings including ratifying the appointment of the new Central Bank Governor. Disagreements among council members could significantly affect whether Naji Issa’s appointment is accepted or rejected, potentially turning the Central Bank into yet another arena of political conflict and worsening Libya’s ongoing financial crisis.

With agreements continuously faltering and stopgap solutions failing to address underlying issues, the Libyan crisis appears to be deepening and drifting further away from any real resolution. Internal divisions and clashing interests make it difficult for any agreement to see the light of day, let alone be fully implemented. The appointment of Naji Issa as Central Bank Governor is just one more example of the complex and layered challenges Libya faces at a time when the country desperately needs comprehensive, sustainable solutions rather than temporary fixes and political bargaining.