The Final Dance of al-Menfi!

Throughout history, the strength of a political leader has never been measured solely by the number of soldiers under his command, but by the number of options still available to him. When the circle begins to tighten and every road closes one after another, leaders are left with only two choices:

Either to bend or to jump.

Yet some refuse to bend. Instead, they choose what might be called "the last dance" that final moment when a leader moves with force, not because he possesses overwhelming power, but because he no longer has enough time.

Forget, for a moment, my description of Al-Menfi as a leader. By God, that in itself is one of history's cruel ironies and nature's greatest anomalies. Yet this is the fate that this period of our country's history has imposed upon us, and whether we accept it or not, we are compelled to begin our analysis using these titles and these "leaders."

Over the past few days, Mr. Al-Menfi published a statement on his "X" platform account in which he openly rejected the attempt by Massad Boulos, the American envoy, to broker a political settlement between the Dbeibeh and Haftar families. According to the reported proposal, Saddam Haftar would become President of the Presidential Council, while Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh would remain Prime Minister, following the recent agreement between both camps to unify government spending and commit themselves to implementing it.

Naturally, such an initiative is not in Al-Menfi's interest. The negotiations are currently taking place between two parties of which he is not one, while part of the proposed arrangement reportedly requires his removal from office. Moreover, Stephanie Williams, Deputy Head of the UN Mission in Libya, previously stated that the mission's policy aligns with the American initiative for resolving the Libyan crisis, praising Massad Boulos and his efforts to forge consensus among Libya's rival factions.

While all of this has been unfolding, Al-Menfi, following the statement mentioned above, has been attempting to gather together the military forces directly aligned with him. He has met with Abdul Raouf Kara, commander of the Special Deterrence Force; Abuzriba, head of the Stability Support Apparatus (the agency that has seemingly returned from the dead!); Al-Namroush, Chief of Staff of the Libyan Army in the Western Region; as well as Al-Juwaili, commander of the Western Mountain Military Zone, who is widely known for his opposition to Dbeibeh's government. He also met with a group of elders from Misrata who oppose Dbeibeh's administration and who, to some extent, represent much of the military establishment that rejects the Dbeibeh family's executive approach.

Many observers believe these meetings came as a direct consequence of Al-Menfi's statement, in which he employed language that could only be interpreted as that of someone preparing to announce a political coup. Given the current circumstances, his only realistic option would be a military move provided he succeeds in convincing these various actors to prevent the proposed agreement from materializing and to create a new reality that might force the Americans to reconsider their preferred political settlement.

This interpretation is further reinforced by the fact that many military actors in western Libya believe that once Saddam Haftar sets foot in Tripoli as President of the Presidential Council a position that also carries the title of Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces he will not stop there. Within months, they believe, he would move against everyone else and impose an entirely new political reality. That is how they see it. They argue that anyone familiar with the Haftar project understands that the Rajma camp ultimately seeks to rule the country without genuine partnership. They point to what they consider a clear pattern in Haftar's dealings with former allies across territories now under his control: sooner or later, they were either quietly marginalized or put in chains.

There is also another military force generally regarded as being aligned with the government, yet which, in reality, does not accept a settlement that would allow Saddam Haftar to enter Tripoli in this manner. According to many observers, such a development would effectively spell the end of its own influence. We are speaking here of Mahmoud Hamza and his brigade. Hamza himself reportedly views this arrangement as a direct threat to his rapidly growing military ambitions within western Libya's evolving balance of power. Likewise, forces from Misrata and Zawiya understand that such a deal would significantly reduce their future influence. For this reason, supporters of this interpretation believe Al-Menfi's call has many ears willing to hear it and many rifles prepared to answer it.

This analysis is not necessarily an assessment of Al-Menfi's actual ability to carry out such a move. Rather, it reflects the logic of militia interests, which has governed political and military decision-making in western Libya throughout the past decade: whenever a single enemy emerges who threatens all armed factions simultaneously, they unite against him. Therefore, do not be surprised if, tomorrow, you witness armored vehicles belonging to the 444 Brigade fighting alongside those of the Special Deterrence Force on the very same hilltop. If that happens, simply understand why and make sure you lock your front door well.

Al-Menfi may ultimately serve as the political cover however symbolic that the armed groups opposing this agreement require. Equally, the Dbeibeh family may surprise him before he is able to move at all.

But what I truly want you to understand, dear (citizen in the finest of forms), is that you do not occupy a place among the priorities of any of those we have mentioned not even in their imagination. So gather whatever patience you can, avoid standing near windows in the days ahead, and pray that God grants all of us clearer vision those of us who still live upon this land and helps us realize that perhaps we are capable of doing more than merely waiting patiently and staying away from the windows.