السياسي

Five Years of 5+5 and the Bullet is Still Chambered!

Five Years of 5+5 and the Bullet is Still Chambered!

“Five Years of 5+5 ، and the Bullet Is Still Chambered !

 

After five years have passed since the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020, there emerges an urgent need to reassess the current situation and thoroughly examine the extent to which the main provisions of this agreement which ended one of the darkest periods of this country’s modern history have actually been implemented.

The country has witnessed a partial yet fragile achievement in halting hostilities, as sporadic clashes between militias and formal and informal armed groups continue to threaten stability and rekindle the specter of war every now and then.

As for the withdrawal of mercenaries and foreign forces, there has been a major failure; their presence is still visible in the country, with reports indicating continued flows of weapons and foreign fighters. Although some confidence-building measures such as reopening roads and exchanging detainees have seen limited progress, this has not resulted in any meaningful political breakthrough capable of ending the prevailing political and security fluidity. Meanwhile, the process of unifying the military institution remains completely stalled, despite international attempts to pay more attention to this file. Deep divisions and the subordination of armed units to multiple actors continue to cast their shadow over the military scene between the two sides of the conflict and even among forces aligned with the government in western Libya. Indeed, most of the recent clashes if not all were between forces belonging to the army or police of the Dbeibah government.

Within the current context, the Joint Military Commission (5+5) stands as one of the most frequently mentioned entities. Since its formation in 2020, the commission has shown continuous insistence on dialogue and affirmed in a recent statement marking the fifth anniversary of the agreement its commitment to its terms. However, the transformation of this commission from a temporary body meant to monitor implementation over a period not exceeding months, into a permanent entity still accompanying us with its meetings and statements after five years, reflects the persistence of the crisis and the absence of serious, structural solutions. Technical dialogue between the military members of the commission has effectively become a substitute for effective political solutions. We believe the wide gap between dialogue and political implementation represents the major obstacle: the commission lacks real power to compel regional and international actors to withdraw forces or stop military support, and the subordination of its members to conflict factions and their vulnerability to them undermines its credibility and distances it from being a neutral and objective actor.

As this situation persists, questions grow about Libya’s future under the current circumstances caught between the brink of war and the path of politics. UN reports emphasize the fragility of the truce, noting that the presence of foreign forces and accumulating weapons creates a combustible environment. The failure of the political process and the repeated postponement of elections deepen frustration, which may push some parties toward reconsidering military options. Nonetheless, general war fatigue appears to be a key factor favoring the continuation of the ceasefire as none of the actors possess the will or capability for full-scale war, and the international community, despite its divisions, recognizes the risks of collapse even if the current stability remains fragile.

Regarding the core question of a political solution, indicators clearly show that a military solution is impossible the one who attacked in 2019 will not repeat his attempt, at least for now, and the one who defended in 2019 cannot even put his internal house in order, let alone mount an offensive against his rival. The only viable path must be political. Past events have proven that any military gain for any side is temporary and reversible. However, the continued bravado of foreign states immersed in Libya’s affairs may still threaten an explosion especially as the country, under the weakness of its rulers and their reliance on their proxies, has turned into a proxy battleground among multiple nations. The international community must assume responsibility by avoiding division and acting seriously, as some states keep violating the arms embargo, prolonging the crisis.

Another area where we have seen nothing but posturing over the past years is national reconciliation. In eastern Libya, there is a committee headed by Al-Sadiq Khalifa Haftar, while in western Libya the file is led by Presidential Council member Abdullah Al-Lafi, and in the south, figures march to their own tune seeing Saif Al-Gaddafi as the future. A bitter reality that makes reconciliation committees themselves in need of reconciliation. Yet national reconciliation remains crucial as a foundation for any political settlement especially in building trust, defining mechanisms for accountability, and ending the culture of impunity that fuels cycles of violence.

 

In conclusion, while the ceasefire agreement represents an important achievement, it risks becoming a gateway for profiteering by certain actors. The greatest danger is no longer a full-scale war, but stagnation and the spread of a “no war, no peace” condition. Here, military fluidity persists, temporary bodies turn into permanent structures, and thieves continue draining the country and its resources eroding any chance of building a stable and secure state in Libya.