The Appointment of Saddam Haftar: A Bet on Succeeding His Father? 

 It is widely said that Khalifa Haftar has seven sons and one daughter. Three of his male sons are steadily growing in influence within their father’s kingdom, and it appears that each of them has ambitions of succeeding him on the throne of Cyrenaica he currently rules and why not the throne of Libya he desperately seeks to obtain. This description reflects the fate of a family-based rule that has turned the army into a private empire through which it seized everything possible.

The competing sons of Haftar are:

Saddam (former Commander of Ground Forces and currently Deputy General Commander).

Khaled (Chief of Staff of the Security Units).

Belqasim (Director of the Libya Reconstruction and Development Fund).

To a lesser degree, the name of the eldest son Al-Siddiq appears, who heads the Supreme Council for National Reconciliation in the eastern region. Despite his obvious ambitions, he is considered the least influential and least favored of Haftar’s sons.

Despite the apparent rivalry among the brothers and each one’s attempt to inherit his father’s throne, the father seems to have made up his mind and chosen his preferred successor. On August 11, he took a bold step perceived as pre-arrangement for the day after his absence. This bold and expected step was appointing his son, “Field Marshal” Saddam Khalifa Haftar, as his deputy and General Commander of the Libyan Armed Forces.

This step was not merely a routine military promotion it carries deep implications clearly signaling that Saddam is the legitimate heir to the military leadership. And since the army in Cyrenaica is the backbone of power, and Khalifa Haftar is the absolute ruler, Saddam’s inheritance of his army is an inheritance of his kingdom itself.

Haftar’s story with the pursuit of power dates back to his return to Libya in 2011 and the establishment of an armed group he unilaterally named the Libyan National Army, followed by his attempted coup against the General National Congress in 2012 and his declaration of freezing the constitutional declaration and assuming authority. But that declaration died before being born, and he was forced to flee Tripoli toward Benghazi, where he began mobilizing tribal forces to form the nucleus of a military force through which he announced what he called Operation Dignity in 2014, after which he received the blessing of the House of Representatives, and Aguila Saleh named him General Commander with the House reserving the symbolic title of Supreme Commander.

In 2015, the Skhirat Agreement was signed, assigning the Presidential Council the title of Supreme Commander of the Army. This did not sit well with Haftar, who even without announcing an explicit rebellion never pledged allegiance to anyone but himself. He instead began expanding his family’s influence and sidelining the Barqawis who formed the basis of his army, effectively transforming the army into a family-owned institution where sons and in-laws obtained the highest military ranks even though none had ever passed by a military academy, let alone graduated from one.

But behind the apparent family unity in running this private military institution, the Haftar household has lived under latent tensions over succession. Saddam was not the only contender Khaled rivaled him in military influence, and Belqasim in vast civilian authority. In the background stands Al-Siddiq, with his poetry and persona. Yet the father finally settled the dispute in favor of his youngest son for several reasons:

International acceptance, as Saddam managed to present himself as a viable actor in Libya’s complex equation. He successfully built a network of relations with Moscow, Ankara, Cairo, and even Washington, making him appear as a reliable international partner.

Absolute loyalty to the family and its interests, having risen through the ranks of his father’s forces since their creation in 2012, actively working to strengthen and expand their reach through several (heist) operations to obtain money from the Al-Aman Bank in Tripoli, to the Central Bank branch in Benghazi, to assassinations, raids, and field executions all of which made him the closest to the family’s interests.

Saddam also succeeded in forging a fake legitimacy for his meteoric rise within the military institution. How can a civilian obtain a military rank let alone the rank of Field Marshal, which 99% of real officers never reach? But Saddam managed to do so through military courses in Jordan and the UAE, and an academic degree in military sciences from Egypt that gave a veneer of legitimacy to his fabricated rank.

The paradox, however, is that Haftar   who suffered previous strokes, was treated in Jordan, France, and elsewhere, and rushed to install his sons to avoid collapse of his project   may ironically have risked its downfall by appointing one of them. This is due to hidden public rejection of family rule and its repressive practices since its emergence in Benghazi in 2014. Arrests, assassinations, raids, and wars in Benghazi, Derna, Sabha, Murzuq, and Tripoli along with horrific crimes have cultivated feelings of deep hatred that will not vanish with the father’s departure.

Added to that is the internal family struggle. Appointing Saddam may fuel a hidden conflict with his brother Khaled, who is older and of equal rank. The rivalry between them has long been rumored, despite attempts to cover it with mutual visits, red carpets, and exchanged shields.

So was Saddam’s appointment part of a family power-sharing agreement, or merely Haftar’s own personal calculation?

Whichever the case, Haftar’s appointment sends a clear message: his possible absence will not create a vacuum his son will fill it.

Meanwhile, the Presidential Council in Tripoli (“the Supreme Commander of the Libyan Army”) considers this step one that complicates the fragile peace equation, as it bypasses its authority in promotions and appointments to sensitive military positions.

Away from speculation, Saddam’s appointment entrenches a model of family rule that turns the army into a private militia. History teaches us that armies built on loyalty to individuals and families not the state collapse once the founding father is gone. Libya, which suffered such collapse in 2011, does not need a crown prince it needs a national army that unites rather than divides.

Saddam, the son of his father, will not be the backbone of a real national army he will only serve as a guardian of his father’s legacy before it turns into dust.