UN Initiatives in Libya’s Maze: “The Impossible Solution!”
In the face of a political deadlock that has paralyzed Libya for over a decade, and after countless initiatives and dialogues that have wandered aimlessly through the labyrinth of the Libyan crisis, the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) returns with yet another initiative—one more to add to a long list of efforts that have failed to produce any meaningful change.
Last month, the acting head of UNSMIL, Stephanie Khoury, announced the details of her new initiative, which has received the backing of the UN Security Council. On Tuesday, the mission announced the formation of the “Advisory Committee” under Khoury’s plan. This step came just days after the appointment of Ghanaian diplomat Hanna Serwaa Tetteh as the new Special Representative for Libya. Against this backdrop, questions arise: can these steps actually be transformed into real opportunities for resolution, or are they just formalities in a crisis the international community has failed to manage?
On Tuesday, the UN mission unveiled a 12-member advisory committee made up of what it described as “Libyan legal and political experts.” The committee’s role is to review election laws and propose a new executive authority. Although the initiative is framed as a “step to enhance dialogue,” the fact that the committee is merely advisory in nature raises doubts about its effectiveness. The committee holds no binding power, and its proposals are not obligatory for Libya’s political factions particularly given their entrenched grip on power and privileges. There are also no clear international guarantees or enforcement mechanisms announced by UNSMIL to ensure the implementation of the committee’s recommendations.
Meanwhile, internal divisions persist. The Tripoli-based government remains entrenched, empowered by armed factions with whom it shares authority. Similarly, the eastern government is fortified by Khalifa Haftar and his forces. Any dialogue that fails to address this foundational issue of dueling governments backed by militias is inherently weakened from the outset.
In this context, the initiative appears to be yet another reminder of past failures: the 2015 National Dialogue, the international conferences in France, Germany, and Italy, and the political dialogue in Geneva in 2020 all of which collapsed due to a lack of political will. This prompts the inevitable question: is Khoury’s initiative simply a temporary palliative, or does it offer the foundation for a lasting solution?
Coinciding with the committee’s formation is Hanna Tetteh’s assumption of her new role as Special Representative. She faces monumental challenges, starting with the international division within the Security Council especially the U.S. Russia divide over Libya. Russia aims to bolster its influence in eastern Libya through support for Haftar, seeking to recover losses and secure strategic footholds. In contrast, the U.S., UK, and EU are trying to contain this expansion and prevent Russia from establishing military bases that could threaten Europe’s southern flank and U.S. interests.
Tetteh must also navigate complex regional dynamics. Turkey, a key player, supports the Dbeibah government in Tripoli. Meanwhile, Egypt and the UAE back eastern authorities to counter Turkish influence though both have recently shown some flexibility. Added to this is the European economic rivalry: Italy leans toward the Tripoli government, while France having lost ground in Africa backs Haftar, seeking to strengthen its presence in southern Libya, which remains under Haftar’s military control.
Despite these international and regional rivalries, the greatest obstacle remains the lack of genuine national will among Libya’s political elites. Factions on both sides refuse to relinquish power or wealth. They hide behind nationalistic rhetoric to justify their expansion and eliminate rivals.
These factors render Tetteh’s role more akin to “crisis management” than solution-building, especially given the UN’s limited authority and the lack of international consensus. While new rounds of dialogue have been announced, their chances of success remain slim as entrenched factions cling to power. The House of Representatives insists on unworkable election laws and simultaneous parliamentary and presidential elections, which its opponents view as a smokescreen. Meanwhile, the High Council of State remains internally divided, with no agreed-upon representative for upcoming talks. The Tripoli government rejects any measures that could threaten its hold on power and continues to insist that any solution must start with a referendum on the constitution a process opposed by Haftar and the eastern parliament.
As each side digs in, arms continue to flow into Libya despite international resolutions. Reports confirm that Turkey, Russia, and the UAE continue to violate the arms embargo, fueling readiness for renewed conflict instead of dialogue. This militarization is compounded by deep societal divisions and a lack of trust among Libya’s components products of years of war which make any dialogue highly uncertain.
In this climate, proposals like revising the election law seem inadequate unless paired with real international pressure to force concessions.
We are now likely facing one of three scenarios:
1. Continued Stalemate: This is the most probable scenario, given the stagnating dialogue and international attention shifting to other crises (like Ukraine and Gaza).
2. Limited Military Escalation: Some factions may resort to military action to strengthen their negotiating positions especially with ongoing foreign backing. This is already hinted at by recent statements from Haftar, troop movements in the south, and major military exercises in Sirte.
3. An Unexpected Breakthrough (least likely): A surprise consensus driven by Tetteh, backed by unprecedented international or regional pressure.
Ultimately, Libya’s crisis persists not due to a lack of initiatives, but due to the absence of mechanisms to implement them. Tragically, Libya has become a theater for international score-settling used by foreign powers to train mercenaries and threaten rivals while its weak leaders prioritize clinging to power and eliminating adversaries, even if it means offering the country’s resources to foreign interests.
At the international level, no initiative will succeed without bold, structural steps to neutralize the warring militias which act as the real powers behind Libya’s official governments. This includes enforcing a strict arms embargo with real monitoring mechanisms, imposing sanctions on militia financiers and political warlords, and bolstering neutral institutions like the judiciary, the High National Elections Commission, and the Constitutional Drafting Assembly safeguarding them from political interference.
Yet, in a world where narrow interests dominate global decision-making, it seems Libya will remain hostage to the “impossible solution” until the game of great power politics ends, or until the Libyan people awaken and realize that waiting for salvation from abroad is like “waiting for olive oil to arrive from Gharyan.”